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Abstract
Kemler Nelson (1984) reported that incidental training, rela-
tive to intentional training, increased the prevalence of overall
similarity classification, supporting a non-deliberative account
of overall similarity sorting. However, the analysis conducted
by Kemler Nelson (1984) does not adequately distinguish be-
tween usage of an overall similarity classification strategy and
single-attribute strategies. The current study replicates Kemler
Nelson’s (1984) experiment, seeking to test the original con-
clusions using a more rigorous analysis. The current study ap-
proximates the original experimental procedure, using almost
identical stimuli and a longer, modified test phase. Results
replicate those found by Kemler Nelson (1984) when the orig-
inal analysis is applied; however the model-based analysis sug-
gest an overall similarity classification strategy is used rarely
and that incidental training increases the prevalence of sub-
optimal single-attribute strategies. These results imply that
overall similarity classification may be more deliberative than
previously thought.
Keywords: incidental training, overall similarity classifica-
tion, single-attribute classification, model-based analysis.
In a seminal study, Brooks (1978) described two processes
of categorization. In analytic categorization, the participant
separates aspects of the stimulus and evaluates their ability
to predict category membership. Brooks assumed analytic
categorization would lead to a subset of the stimulus dimen-
sions controlling responding. In non-analytic categorization,
the participant predicts category membership on the basis of
overall similarity of all stimulus dimensions to known ex-
amples. Brooks suggested that non-analytic categorization
would be prevalent when a person’s cognitive resources were
limited. Another way of phrasing this hypothesis is to say
that overall similarity classification is considered to be less
deliberative than, for example, single-dimension classifica-
tion. For brevity, we will describe this as the less-is-more
hypothesis; e.g. less time spent categorizing objects results
in more information from those objects having control over
responding. We will contrast this with the more-is-more hy-
pothesis; e.g. more time spent categorizing objects results
in more information from those objects having control over
responding.
Following the publication of Brooks (1978), experimen-
tal evidence seeming to support a less-is-more hypothesis of
categorization accumulated. Ward (1983) used a triad pro-
cedure, where stimulus triplets are presented, to show that
reducing time for categorization increased overall similarity
classifications and decreased dimensionally based classifica-
tions. This result was replicated in Smith and Kemler Nel-
son (1984) who further demonstrated that concurrent load,
and instructions that encourage impressionistic responding,
increased overall similarity responses. A classic study by
Kemler Nelson (1984) used incidental training, where al-
though category membership information is presented on all
trials, participants were not directed to attend to it, and com-
pared it to intentional training, where a participant is directed
to attend to relevant category membership information to en-
able correct classification. She found that those who learned
the category structure incidentally made more overall similar-
ity classifications than those who learned the category struc-
ture intentionally. Smith and Shapiro (1989) followed a simi-
lar procedure to Kemler Nelson (1984), but manipulated con-
current load. They found that concurrent load increased over-
all similarity classifications.
However, not all experimental evidence supported the less-
is-more hypothesis. Ward and Scott (1987) found that clas-
sifying by overall similarity took longer than by a single-
attribute-plus-exception strategy. Several studies found no
significant effect of time pressure on overall similarity clas-
sifications (Smith & Kemler Nelson, 1984, Experiment 4;
Smith & Shapiro, 1989, Experiments 2-3). Nevertheless, the
less-is-more hypothesis became widely accepted by the end
of the 1990’s. Goldstone and Barsalou (1998) stated that,
“evidence suggests that in many situations, it is easier for peo-
ple to base similarity and categorization judgments on more,
rather than fewer, properties (p.239-240).
More recent research seemingly provides further support
for the less-is-more hypothesis. Waldron and Ashby (2001)
demonstrated that concurrent load retarded the acquisition
of a single-dimension category structure more than it re-
tarded the acquisition of a multidimensional category struc-
ture. Zeithamova and Maddox (2006) used a different stim-
ulus set to Waldron and Ashby (2001), and found a similar
effect.
Of course, as with earlier research, not all evidence sup-
ported the less-is-more hypothesis. Milton, Longmore, and
Wills (2008) reported multiple experiments where increased
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time pressure resulted in a reduction of overall similarity clas-
sifications in a spontaneous classification task, although one
result consistent with a less-is-more strategy was reported.
Wills et al. (2009) compared pigeons, squirrels and adult hu-
mans under closely matched conditions, but failed to find any
species difference in the relative prevalence of overall sim-
ilarity versus single-dimension classification. Wills, Milton,
Longmore, Hester, and Robinson (2013) provide support for a
more-is-more hypothesis, reporting three experiments where
manipulation of concurrent load reduces overall similarity
classification. A further two experiments suggest that those
using an overall similarity classification strategy had larger
working memory capacities, and that instructions to respond
meticulously increase the frequency of overall similarity clas-
sifications.
Wills et al. (2013) also provide a critique of the methodolo-
gies of the supporting research, in particular the criterial at-
tribute procedure used in Kemler Nelson (1984) and the triad
procedure used in Ward (1983). They suggest that none of
the methodologies used previously adequately distinguish be-
tween less-is-more and more-is-more hypotheses (see Wills et
al. (2013) for a more detailed review of these points). The cur-
rent study focuses upon further investigation of the method-
ology employed in Kemler Nelson (1984). Kemler Nelson
(1984) is widely regarded as a seminal study in the investi-
gation of the less-is-more hypothesis. We refer to their pro-
cedure here as the criterial attribute procedure, the abstract
structure of which can be seen in Figure 1. There are two
methods of attaining 100% accuracy during the procedure’s
training phase, responding based on the criterial attribute(the
dimension of a stimulus that perfectly predicts category mem-
bership, D1 in Figure 1), and responding based on informa-
tion from at least three of the dimensions of a stimulus (e.g.
D2,D3 and D4 in Figure 1). The first method is referred to
as the Criterial Attribute strategy (a single-attribute strategy),
whilst the second method is referred to as the Family Resem-
blance strategy (an overall similarity strategy).
Training stimuli
Category A Category B
D1 D2 D3 D4 D1 D2 D3 D4
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
Critical Test Stimuli
D1 D2 D3 D4
0 1 1 1
1 0 0 0
Figure 1: Training stimuli and critical test stimuli
Participants underwent either incidental or intentional
training, followed by a test phase. Participants trained in-
cidentally completed an old/new recognition task, with cat-
egory membership information about each stimulus inciden-
tally presented, whilst those trained intentionally received a
feedback driven categorization task. The critical test stim-
uli, seen in Figure 1, are used to distinguish between the two
strategies, family resemblance and criterial attribute. A per-
son using the criterial attribute strategy would put the first
critical test stimulus in Category A and the second in Cate-
gory B, given that in Figure 1 classifying on the basis of the
criterial attribute D1 suggests Category A membership for the
first critical test stimulus, and Category B membership for the
second critical test stimulus. A person using the family re-
semblance strategy would respond in the opposite way, as the
majority of dimensions for the first critical stimulus suggest
Category B membership, and the majority of dimensions for
the second critical stimulus suggest Category A membership.
Kemler Nelson (1984) found that adults trained inciden-
tally are more likely to employ a family resemblance strat-
egy than those trained intentionally. Kemler Nelson (1984)
is commonly used as evidence in support of the less-is-more
hypothesis, but the critical test stimuli used to assess catego-
rization strategy pose a potential problem. Another possible
strategy in addition to the family resemblance and criterial
attribute strategies is a non-criterial attribute strategy. A non-
criterial attribute strategy is another single-attribute strategy,
where a participant responds on the basis on a single attribute
that does not perfectly predict category membership, e.g. D2
in Figure 1. Use of a non-criterial attribute strategy would
result in 75% accuracy during the training phase, enough to
pass the learning criterion. The problem arises from the fact
that responses that indicate a family resemblance strategy are
identical to those indicative of a non-criterial attribute strat-
egy. It is possible that the apparent prevalence of the fam-
ily resemblance strategy in the incidental condition is partly
due to participants using the non-criterial attribute strategy
instead. Although Kemler Nelson (1984) does discuss this
issue and prevents some fairly informal analyses, we felt the
issue merited further, more rigorous, examination.
The present study attempts to determine the strategy used
by each participant by looking at responses to all the stimuli
presented, as opposed to just the critical test stimuli. The use
of a model-based analysis could reveal one of two things, that
the family resemblance strategy is indeed prevalent in partici-
pants trained incidentally, or that the prevalence of family re-
semblance strategy found in Kemler Nelson (1984) was due
to participants using a non-criterial attribute strategy. With
this in mind, the present study aims to replicate Kemler Nel-
son (1984), using the same procedure but with an extended





106 undergraduate psychology students at the University of
Plymouth participated for course credit. The experiment was
conducted on standard PCs, connected to 19 inch flat-screen
monitors. Responses were collected using standard PC key-
boards. Participants sat roughly 30 cm from the screen. The
experiment was run using E-Prime version 2.0.
Stimuli
The stimuli were caricatured line drawings of faces, closely
based on those in Experiment 1 of Kemler Nelson (1984),
but using ear size as a dimension instead of eye color. Ex-
ample stimuli are shown in Figure 2. The stimuli varied on
four dimensions; hair (straight or curly), ears (large or small),
nose (large or small) and moustache(large or small), with the
levels of each dimension counterbalanced between partici-
pants. One dimension perfectly predicted category member-
ship, with the specific dimension counterbalanced between
participants. Each face stimulus was approximately 6cm high
and 8cm wide. The 8 stimuli used in training are shown in
Figure 1, the test stimuli were all 16 stimuli possible in this
four dimensional binary set.
Figure 2: Example stimuli
Procedure
Participants were assigned to one of two conditions, the inten-
tional condition and the incidental condition. The experiment
consisted of two sections, a training phase and a test phase.
The training phase comprised three blocks of the eight train-
ing stimuli seen in Figure 1, with order of presentation ran-
domised within each block. The test phase comprised eight
blocks of the sixteen possible stimuli, with order of presenta-
tion randomised within each block. In contrast to the original
study, all stimuli were presented equally often, whereas in
Kemler Nelson (1984) the critical test stimuli were presented
more frequently than other stimuli in the test phase. Block
breaks in both phases were not signalled to participants.
Training phase. Participants in the intentional condition
were told that their task was to identify whether each face was
that of a doctor or a policeman. Participants were told that
they should try to figure out the rule for identifying whether
a face was a policeman or a doctor. Feedback was given for
each response, either correcting or confirming their response.
Each trial started with the presentation of the two uniforms,
to the bottom left and bottom right of the screen respectively.
The uniforms both had a height of 4.5 cm; the doctor’s had a
width of 5 cm and the policeman’s had a width of 9 cm. After
1000ms, the face stimulus appeared in the center of the top of
the screen above the uniforms. After a further 2000 ms, “C
- Policeman” and “M - Doctor” appeared indicating the re-
sponse keys to be used. The side of the screen on which each
uniform appeared was counterbalanced between participants.
Once the participant had responded, feedback was presented
for 1500ms. Feedback took the form of the face transpos-
ing onto the correct uniform and either the word “correct” or
“incorrect” appearing at the top of the screen. After 24 such
training trials, participants were moved on to the test phase.
Participants in the incidental condition were told that their
task was to decide whether or not they had previously seen a
face, before rating their confidence in each decision. No feed-
back was given on their responses. The faces were presented
above the uniform of the group they belonged to; no men-
tion was made of the significance of this. Each trial started
with the presentation of the two uniforms, to the bottom left
and bottom right of the screen respectively. The side of the
screen on which each uniform appeared was counterbalanced
between participants. After 1000ms, the face stimulus ap-
peared combined with the correct uniform. After a further
2000 ms the question “Seen before?” and the response keys
“Y/N” appeared in the center of the bottom of the screen. Af-
ter a response was made, the question “Confidence?” and the
response keys “1 - 2 - 3” (1 being the least confident, 3 being
the most confident) appeared at the center of the bottom of the
screen. It is noted that an optimally responding participant in
the incidental condition would respond consistently with “N”
for each trial after the first block. Whilst this is a somewhat
strange task, it does follow the incidental task of the original
study. After 24 trials, participants were moved on to the test
phase.
Test phase. Participants in the intentional condition were
informed that they would be performing the same task, but
without feedback. Participants in the incidental condition
were told that they should have noticed that in the training
phase some of the faces belonged to doctors and some to po-
licemen. They were told that they would see the same faces
as in the training phase and that they should aim to categorise
them as either doctors or policemen. No feedback was given.
The structure of the test trials was identical to the training
phase of the intentional condition, without the feedback at
the end of each trial.
Results
In Kemler Nelson (1984), participants who failed to reach
a criterion of two thirds correct on the training stimuli pre-
sented in the test phase were excluded from further analysis.
Our test phase was much longer to enable use of the model-
based analysis, so the criterion used in the present study was
two thirds correct on the training stimuli in the first three
blocks of the test phase. This is the closest match to the orig-
inal criterion that could be used. Applying this criterion left
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Table 1: Average number of classification strategy judge-
ments made on critical test stimuli between conditions
Condition Criterial Attribute Family Resemblance
Intentional 10.9 5.1
Incidental 7.6 8.4
29 participants in the intentional conditions and 30 in the in-
cidental condition. In order to achieve these approximately
equal group sizes, more participants had to be run in the in-
cidental condition than the intentional condition (35 inten-
tional, 71 incidental). In Kemler Nelson (1984) a similar pat-
tern was noted (17 intentional, 23 incidental, to produce 16
participants in each condition), although the difference was
not as extreme as in the present study.
Original study analyses. The first result of interest is the
number of criterial attribute judgements and family resem-
blance judgements made on the critical test stimuli in each
condition, which are reported in Table 1. The test stimuli
appeared a total of sixteen times in each condition. There
were significantly more criterial attribute judgements made
on the critical test stimuli in the intentional condition than
the incidental condition, t(55) = 2.14, p = 0.037. Of math-
ematical necessity, there are also significantly more family
resemblance judgements made on the critical test stimuli in
the incidental condition than the intentional condition.
It is also worth noting that participants in the inten-
tional condition made significantly more criterial attribute
judgements than family resemblance judgements, t(28) =
2.48, p= 0.02. However, participants in the incidental condi-
tion did not make significantly more of one type of judgement
than the other, t(29) = 0.37, p= 0.71.
Model-Based Analysis A model-based analysis was also
conducted on the results of the experiment. The analysis
consisted of assigning each stimulus the predicted responses
of each categorization strategy that we examined (family re-
semblance, criterial attribute, non-criterial attribute and a re-
sponse key preference strategy). For each response made in
line with the predicted response of a particular categorization
strategy, that specific strategy scored a point. This was re-
peated for each stimulus presented during the 128 trials of
the test phase for each individual participant. At the end the
scores for each strategy were totalled, and the strategy with
the highest consistency score was deemed to be the best fit-
ting strategy for that participant, and the most likely strategy
they were employing, a similar method to that employed by
Thompson (1994) in the context of a different paradigm. The
consistency score represents the number of responses made
in line with the predicted responses of a particular catego-
rization strategy. For six of the sixteen different test phase
stimuli, the overall similarity strategy can make no prediction
(e.g. 1010). For these stimuli the family resemblance strategy
scored half a point regardless of the participant’s response.
Further Analyses. The number of participants using the
Table 2: The number of participants best fitting each strategy
Condition FR CA NCA
Intentional 2 19 7
Incidental 1 13 16
family resemblance, criterial attribute and non-criterial at-
tribute strategies are reported in Table 2. One person in the
intentional condition was excluded from analysis as response
key preference was the best fitting strategy of learning. In-
spection of the table reveals two points of interest. First, the
family resemblance strategy was rarely used in either con-
dition. Second, incidental training, relative to intentional
training, seems to increase the prevalence of non-criterial at-
tribute classification - a sub-optimal single-attribute strategy,
χ2(1,N = 55) = 4.5, p= 0.034.
The average consistency score across the participants in
the intentional condition was 116(91%), and in the incidental
condition was 103.9(81%), both of which are above chance.
The average consistency score for the intentional condition
was significantly higher than the average consistency score
for the incidental condition, t(53) = 3.1, p= 0.0031.
Discussion
The present study found the same effect reported in
Kemler Nelson (1984) when applying their analysis, but
when the more rigorous model-based analysis was applied
found instead that the family resemblance strategy was used
rarely and that incidental training, relative to intentional train-
ing, increases the prevalence of sub-optimal single-attribute
strategies. This does not support the findings of the original
study and instead seems to support a more-is-more hypothesis
of categorization.
These results seem to contradict those found by
Kemler Nelson (1984). A possible explanation lies in the dif-
ferences between the training received by participants. Inten-
tional training focuses participants on the fact that there is a
problem to be solved, and that the trial-by-trial feedback on
category membership will help them do this. Under such con-
ditions, many participants presumably work out that one at-
tribute perfectly predicts category membership, and they con-
tinue to use this discovery in the test phase.
It is less clear how participants approach the incidental
condition. One possibility is that participants, at the begin-
ning of the test phase, select one attribute and respond on
that basis (e.g. “policemen have large ears”). The fact that
the criterial attribute is selected more often, relative to the
non-criterial attributes, than would be expected by chance
suggests this selection is not entirely random, but it is pre-
sumably harder to identify the criterial attribute from mem-
ory than from the online hypothesis-testing permitted by the
intentional condition procedure.
One limitation of the current study is that six of the six-
teen test stimuli cannot be consistently classified by an overall
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similarity strategy (e.g. 1010). This might have lead to par-
ticipants abandoning the family resemblance strategy upon
realising it could not categorize all the stimuli in the test
phase, and instead adopting a single-attribute strategy. De-
spite slightly increasing the number of participants best fit by
a family resemblance strategy, the conclusions of the current
study are unaffected if those six stimuli are excluded from
the analysis, although removing such stimuli from the experi-
ment entirely would be a stronger test of this hypothesis. This
work is currently underway in our lab.
The participants in the current study seemed to have
a higher failure rate in the incidental condition than in
Kemler Nelson (1984). One possible reason for this could be
the implementation of the procedure electronically, as com-
pleting the procedure 1-on-1 with the experimenter (as was
the case in the original study) could have increased partici-
pant motivation. Given the large sample sizes required for
model-based analyses, individual testing of participants is not
a particularly efficient approach. One alternative - currently
under investigation in our lab - is to extend the length of train-
ing.
One way in which the present study could be further inves-
tigated is through the application of formal models such as the
widely accepted Generalized Context Model. A recent study
by Nosofsky, Denton, Zaki, Murphy-Knudsen, and Unverzagt
(2012) investigated incidental prototype-extraction task per-
formance in cognitively impaired patients, applying a mod-
ified Elimination By Aspects model to their data to give an
explanation of their results. Applying a formal processing
model to the present study’s data is a work currently being
conducted in our lab; we hope to be able to present this at the
conference.
Of course, Kemler Nelson (1984) is not the only study to
support a less-is-more hypothesis from a criterial attribute
procedure. In particular, Smith and Shapiro (1989) is a likely
candidate for replication and application of the model-based
analysis, given the similarities between the procedures used,
and we are currently collecting data for such a replication.
Further avenues for possible research include other method-
ologies for investigating the less-is-more hypothesis, such as
the triad procedure employed by Ward (1983) and Smith and
Kemler Nelson (1984).
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